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Action in a state court to compel the Public Housing Authority to
admit petitioners into a low-cost housing project, without regard to race
or color. The Authority had been granting applications based on its
evaluation of tile applicants' needs and relative hardship, but with an
overriding policy of preserving the same racial composition in the housing
project as existed in the surrounding neighborhood. Held, the "racial
pattern" scheme violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' and similar clauses in the state constitution. 2  Banks v.
Housing Authority, 260 P.2d 668 (Cal. 1953).
Those cases which attempt to define the limits of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as it applies to racial segregation and discrimination, are
not easy to reconcile with each other. Under one line of authority, marked
by the leading case of PIlessy v. Ferguson,3 segregation per se is not a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
provided "equal but separate" facilities are made available to both white
and colored races. Jurisdictions which follow the "equal but separate"
doctrine apply it to the use of public facilities," and generally hold that
the equal protection clause is violated where other rights, such as the
right to serve oil juries," or the right to vote,7 are unequally conferred by law.
This line of authority has met with some favor by those courts which
apparently wish to uphold segregation or discrimination in one form or
another, and whose research seemingly never leads them to more liberal
authority.8  As may be expected, these courts differ noticeably in their
interpretation of the word "equal."
1, U,S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. § 1.
2. CALIf. CONST. Art. 1, §§ 1, 13, 21.
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. Id. at 547. The phrase "equal but separate" apparently originated in Miss.
ACTS 1888, p. 48, which provided that railroads should furnish equal but separate
accommodations for white and colored passengers. '('he constitutionality of this
statute was upheld in Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Ry. v. Mississippi. 133 U.S. 587
(1890). The court in the I'lessy case relied heavily ou this decision.
5. layes v. Crutcheon, 108 F. Supp. 582 (M.D. Tcnn, 1952); Lamwrence v.
Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. VA'a. 1948); Rice v. Arnold. 54 So.2d 114 (Fla.).
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1951); Ilarris v. St. Louis, 233 Mo. App. 911, 111 S.W.2d
995 (1938).
6. Avery v. State, 209 Ga. 116, 70 S.E.2d 716 (1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 559
(1953); Zimmerman v. State, 191 Md. 7, 59 A.2d 675 (1948); Lee v. State, 163 Md.
56, 161 Ati. 284, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 639 (1933).
7. Adams v. Terry, 193 F.2d 600 (5th Cir.). rev'd, 345 U.S. 461 (1952);
Byrd v. Brice, 104 F. Supp. 442 (WV.D. La.), aff'd, 201 F.2d 664 (1953); Brown v.
Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 933 (ED. S.C. 1948).
8. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free
Library of Baltimore, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945); Lopez v. Secombe, 71 F. Supp.
769 (S.D. Cal. 1944); Mills v. Lowndes, 26 F. Supp. 792 (1). Md. 1939); see also
notes 11 and 16 inIra.
9. Conpare Sweeney v. Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Ky. 1951), with
Beal v. Holeombe, 103 F. Supp. 218 (S.D. Tex. 1950), rev'd, 193 F.2d 384 (1951).
CASENOTES
A compelling weight of authority amay be found which, in effect, if
not in words, rejects the reasoning of the Plessy case, and holds that
equality of treatment is not the test, but that segregation or any distinction
in treatment by operation of law is, in itself, repugnant to the equal
protection clause.' 0  Decisions may also be found which arrive at the
same result without recourse to the Fourteenth Amendment."' In one
case' - a state statute' 3 requiring segregation in buses was held unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court as an undue burden on interstate commerce."4
The Supreme Court, in the now leading case, Shelley v. Kraemer,-'5 by
implication discredited' 6 the rule in the Plessy case., but seemed careful
to avoid expressly overruling it.
As is true of cases dealing with other types of racial discrimination.,
the cases concerning housing projects have been the source of seemingly
conflicting decisions. An important case in this field is Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant," in which discrimination against negroes in the selection of
tenants in a private housing project. was held not unconstitutional, on the
grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state action only, not
to the activities of private individuals or groups. In one respect, the
reasoning of the court seems in conflict with the Shelley case, in which
it wvas held that judicial enforcement of a private agreement constituted
state action.', Assuming for the moment that the action of the Stuyvesant
The court in the Sweeney case compelled the city to provide a fishing lake in the
"colored" park, similar to that in the "white" park. The court in the Beal case, in
disposing of the absence of a golf course in a park for its colored inhabitants, said:
Wbhile it does not affirmatively appear that the out-of-door facilities provided
by the city in the parks include many worthy games and activities of other
and former days such as town ball, mumble peg, tournaments, ring base,
bush ranger, etc., it does appear that the cit, with wholesome care has
provided for present-day activities of both races. I do not think the failure
to provide golf courses in parks used by the negroes is either as a niatter of
law or fact a discrimination against the negroes. Id. at 219.
See also 67 HAv. L. REv. 377 (1954).
10. Jones v. Newlon, 81 Colo. 25, 253 Pac. 386 (1927); Seawell v. Mac'Withcv
2 N.J. 463, 67 A.2d 309 (1949); Bullock v. Wooding, 123 N.J.L. 176, 8 A.2d 273
(1939); Patterson v. Board of Education, 11 N.J. Misc. 179, 164 Atl. 892 (1933):
Bruster v. State, 40 Okla. Cr. 25, 266 Pac. 486 (1928); see also note 16, infra.
11. For three cases involving the interpretation of civil rights statutes, see Evans
v. Fong Poy, 42 Cal. App.2d 320, 108 P.2d 9,42 (1941): Delaney v. Central Valley
Golf Club, 289 N.Y. 576, 43 N.E.2d 716 (1942); McCrary v. Jones, 39 N.E.2d
167 (Ohio 1941); see also 56 YALE L.J. 837 (1947).
12. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
13. VA. CoDE § 4097dd (1942).
14. See also Day v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.. 171 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1948);
Williams v. Carolina Coach Co.. lII F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Va. 1952).
15. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
16. Id. at 21. Footnote 28 in the court's opinion makes the following comment-
It should be observed that the restrictions relating to residential occupancy
contained in ordinances involved in the Buchanan, Harmon and Deans cases,
cited supra, and declared by this Court to be inconsistent with the requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied equally to white persons and
Negroes ...
17. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1949), 4 Mlr.vi
L.Q. 102.
18. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Town Corporation did not in itself constitute state action, did not the
holding of this court which gave effect to the discrimination, constitute
state action within the reasoning of the Shelley case? The distinction
between judicial enforcement of private discrimination (held unconstitu-
tional) and judicial refusal to enjoin private discrimination seems a
narrow one.
A New Jersey court was faced with the issue of segregation in a
public housing project in Seawell v. MacWithey.1 Distinguishing the facts
from those of the Dorsey case, the court held that segregation by govern-
mental action fell within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court discussed and explicitly rejected the "equal but separate" rule.
A case identical in fact situation with the principal case is Favors
v. Randall.2' The enforcement by the housing authority of a racial pattern
was specifically in issue. The court cited as authority the Plessy case and
several other Supreme Court decisions 22 which adhered to the "equal
but separate" doctrine, and concluded that the selection of tenants in
accordance with the "neighborhood pattern" did not destroy the legal
equality of the races.23 The rationale of this holding is logical in that
white tenant-applicants would be excluded in equal proportion to colored,
should an excessive number of applications be received. What should
happen if the scheme resulted in vacancies which could not be filled
except by deviating from the pattern, the court does not say.
The principal case, Banks v. Housing Authority, treats the problem
as one of first impression. The court cites no prior California authority,
but relies, with one exception, on Supreme Court decisionsY4  The
defendant housing authority cited the Favors case as authority for the
constitutionality of its action.25  The court discussed the Favors case
19. 2 N.J. Super. 255, 63 A.2d 542 (Ch. 1949), aff'd and modified, 2 N.J. 563,
67 A.2d 309 (1949), 4 RUTGERS L. REV. 506.
20. Id. at 265, 63 A.2d at 546.
21. 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
22. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1940); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S.
78 (1927); McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23. 40 F. Supp. at 747.
...the argument cannot be accepted that equal rights cannot be secured to
the negro, except by an enforced comingling of the two races. Neither the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, nor Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution operate to make the negro race wards of the nation ....
24. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1949); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1949); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1949); Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1940);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S.
70 A1929); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1926); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60 1917); McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Wo
v. opkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885); Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 940 (1951).
25. Banks v. Housing Authority, 260 P.2d 668, 678 (Cal. 19533.
CASENOTES
in its opinion,26 and rejected its holding on somewhat dubious grounds.27
Faced by the need of overcoming the "equal but separate" rule,28 the
court declares, "Appellants by reason of their proportionate racial
needs and neighborhood pattern policies are not furnishing and have
prevented themselves from furnishing housing accommodations to persons
of low income 'upon the basis of equality of right.' ",29 The court further
reasons that if judicial enforcement of racial segregation schemes is
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, 0 it would be anomalous to
permit enforcement of such a scheme by the executive branch of a state
government. In effect, the court simply holds that it is unconstitutional
for the housing authority to consider the color or race of an applicant
in any manner.
In conclusion it appears that the issue of racial segregation in, or
discrimination in granting admission to, public housing projects presents
basically the same constitutional problems as other forms of racial
discrimination. Generally speaking, the Supreme Court seems to show
the greatest willingness to find a violation of the Constitution where
segregation or discrimination is in issue. The lower federal courts, while
theoretically bound by the Supreme Court holdings, appear to be more
readily influenced by local feeling than by stare decisis. 1 The state courts,
as may be expected, range from one extreme to the other in their
interpretation 32 of the Fourteenth- Amendment, and seem to have no
difficulty in finding authority to support practically any point of view.
Greater uniformity of decision in this field of law will probably await




Plaintiff sued for damages resulting from defendant cemetery's refusal
to bury her non-Caucasian husband. She had purchased a plot from
defendant which, by the terms of the contract, restricted burials to
members of the Caucasian race. Held, the restriction was not void as being
26. Ibid,
27. Ibid.
.I .the opinion . . . does not clearly indicate that the court's attention was
pointedly directed to the fact that the rights of 'persons,' not groups, were
involved under the 14th Amendment ....
28. Id. at 673.
29. Id. at 678. The court is quoting from the Missouri case, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
30. See note 18 supra.
31. Cf. Missouri ex Tel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Mendez v.
Westminster School District, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
32. Compare Patterson v. Board of Education, 11 N.J. Misc. 179, 164 At]. 892
(Sup. Ct. 1933), with the opinion of the Texas court in Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2d
442 (Texas 1948), rev'd, 339 U.S. 629 (1949), Noted in 30 B.U.L. REv. 565 (1950).
